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INTRODUCTION

The United States is now recovering from the most severe
1
economic meltdown since the Great Depression. This meltdown
was caused by the record number of defaults on mortgage loans
2
and the foreclosures that followed; the catalyst being the financial
risks taken by the mortgage industry to capitalize on the rapid
3
increase in property values experienced earlier this decade.
Eventually, the risks became too great and borrowers began
4
Property values quickly decreased, and with the
defaulting.
5
decrease came an even bigger wave of foreclosures.
In the movie It’s a Wonderful Life, George Bailey stopped a run
on the Bailey Brothers Building & Loan Association by offering his
explanation of mortgage finance:
You’re thinking of this place all wrong. As if I had the
money back in a safe. The money’s not here . . . your
money is in Joe’s house, right next to yours . . . and in the
Kennedy house, and Mrs. Macklin’s house, and a hundred
others. Why, you’re lending them the money to build,
6
and they’re going to pay it back to you as best they can.
Although most people are unaware, nearly everyone who maintains
a savings account is also in the business of lending money to the
7
mortgage industry. With that said, we’ve come a long way since

1. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Over-Indebtedness, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis,
and the Effect on U.S. Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 395, 396 (2009) (noting that, in
2009, the United States was “in the midst of a severe economic meltdown” with
government bailout efforts surpassed only by the Great Depression).
2. See id. at 396, 413; Kenneth R. Harvey, The Lowdown on Low-Doc Loans,
WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/11/24/AR2006112400503.html (noting the significant
risk lenders were undertaking by issuing more high-interest low-documentation
and no-documentation home loans).
3. Dickerson, supra note 1, at 396. Once home prices start to rise, the
market builds the expectation that the increase is the norm and this expectation,
in turn, increases the demand for houses. Id. See, e.g., Harvey, supra note 2.
4. See Adam J. Levitin, The Crisis Without a Face: Emerging Narratives of the
Financial Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 999, 1009–10 (2009).
5. Dickerson, supra note 1, at 414; Steven Gjerstad & Vernon L. Smith, From
Bubble to Depression?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2009, at A15, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123897612802791281.html.
6. IT’S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946) (quoting James Stewart‘s
character, George Bailey).
7. See Lee Ann Obringer, How Banks Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS,
http://money.howstuffworks.com/personal-finance/banking/bank4.htm
(last
visited Oct. 23, 2010).
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8

the days of George Bailey. To keep pace with the demands of
modern banking, over the years the mortgage industry has made a
number of business innovations, including some significant
9
changes to the land records. This has allowed a mortgage debt to
be purchased from loan originators, like the Bailey Brothers
Building & Loan, and sold to large investment firms where each
mortgage may be bundled together with hundreds of other
10
mortgages and resold in fractionalized shares to private investors.
In George Bailey’s era, each time a mortgage was sold to another
bank or financial institution, the new owner would record a
11
mortgage assignment in the county land records.
Today, because of the complexity of the transfers, many of
12
these assignments are now recorded electronically. Looking at
the security instrument in the county recorder’s office, you are
likely to find the name “Mortgage Electronic Recordation Systems”
listed as the mortgagee of record—a stand-in for the real owner of
13
the debt. Although this innovative business technique has saved
14
millions of dollars since its inception, it also represents a
15
departure from the long-standing traditions of property law.
This departure was the focal point in Jackson v. Mortgage
16
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., where the Minnesota Supreme
17
Court interpreted the foreclosure by advertisement statutes. The
8. See Edward Rothstein, What Would George Bailey Do?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
2008, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/04/arts/television
/04conn.html.
9. See Phyllis K. Slesinger & Daniel McLaughlin, Mortgage Electronic
Registration System, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 805, 812 (1995).
10. See R. K. Arnold, Yes, There is Life on MERS, 11 PROB. & PROP., July/Aug.
1997, at 32, 34.
11. See Slesinger & McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 810–11.
12. Steve Cocheo, Moving From Paper to Blips, 88 A.B.A. BANKING J., January
1996, at 48, 48 (1996).
13. Steve Brandt, Lawsuit Seeks to Block Some Foreclosures, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Jan. 26, 2008, available at http://www.startribune.com/local/west
/14444016.html (noting that in Hennepin County, MERS is listed as the
mortgagee of record on at least half of all new mortgage filings).
14. See Slesinger & McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 812–13; Arnold, supra note
10, at 35.
15. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 5.27
(5th ed. 2007); MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 86 (N.Y. 2006)
(Kaye, C.J., dissenting in part).
16. 770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 2009).
17. The foreclosure by advertisement statutes interpreted by the court in
Jackson are essentially unchanged from the versions enacted over 160 years ago. Id.
at 494 (“The requirements of the statutes have changed very little over the past
160 years.”).
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court found that although electronic recordation may not have
been contemplated when common law principles were established,
18
this innovation is in accord with the plain language of the statutes.
Had the court reached the opposite conclusion, the borrowers in
default may have benefited from the delay, but such a decision
19
would have come at a high price to the public.
This note first examines a brief history of the mortgage
20
It then details the
industry and foreclosures in Minnesota.
21
supreme court’s holding in Jackson, followed by an analysis of that
22
Finally, this note concludes that the court’s
decision.
determination that the defendant’s innovation complies with the
long-standing traditions in Minnesota property law is a sound
23
approach that favors the public’s best interest.
II. HISTORY
A.

The Current Mortgage Crisis

In the early part of this decade, the United States experienced
24
an unprecedented appreciation in property values. On average,
between 1997 and 2005, national home values increased by over
25
fifty-five percent.
However, these gains were not evenly
26
distributed and resulted in unaffordable housing for many buyers.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 500–501.
See infra notes 233–38 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
Dickerson, supra note 1, at 399.
ALLEN J. FISHBEIN & PATRICK WOODALL, EXOTIC OR TOXIC?
AN
EXAMINATION OF THE NON-TRADITIONAL MORTGAGE MARKET FOR CONSUMERS AND
LENDERS, CONSUMER FED’N AM., 28 (2006), available at http://www.consumerfed.org
/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/housing/Exotic_Toxic_Mortgage_Report0
506.pdf. Further, “[i]n 2005, the number of home sales hit a fifth consecutive
record year and home price appreciation was steady across the country, with many
metropolitan areas having annual price increases above 10 percent.” Id. at 28. See
also S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index for Seasonally Adjusted U.S. National Values,
STANDARD & POOR’S (Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.standardandpoors.com
/indices/sp-case-shiller-home-price-indices/en/us/?indexId=spusa-cashpidff--p-us
(follow the hyperlink at the “U.S. Home Price Values/Seasonally Adjusted”
intersection). The index shows an increase in home values on par with inflation
until 1998 when, over the course of a year, values began to grow rapidly reaching a
value increase of over fifteen percent by 2005. Id. By early 2006, values had
peaked and rapidly plummeted in the following quarters. Id.
26. Dickerson, supra note 1, at 400. Specifically, this included many first-time
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Mortgage companies responded by offering nontraditional loans to
27
As a result, many consumers
make housing more affordable.
28
believed they could afford previously unaffordable property.
The extended duration of the housing boom further fueled
29
the consumption of home buyers. With the expectation that value
increase was the norm, many borrowers began to view their home
as an investment, borrowing recklessly based on a plan to refinance
30
when their monthly payments increased.
Many renters were
desperate to realize their own “American Dream of
31
Homeownership”; and many of those who already owned homes
were in a frenzy to either upgrade to a larger, more luxurious
32
33
“McMansion” or buy a second home as an investment property.
To capitalize on this opportunity, lenders further ignored the
risks by substantially relaxing payment requirements and using
34
minimal standards to verify income and assets. Compounding the
financial risk was the fact that many consumers already had
buyers who had been renting during the boom and entirely missed the rapid
increase in property values that homeowners experienced. See generally id. at 400
(“[H]ousing price appreciation ultimately created a significant unaffordability
problem for renters who wanted to purchase homes.”).
27. FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 25, at 1 (“[L]enders offered essentially
two mortgage products: fully amortizing, fixed rate and adjustable rate
mortgages.”).
28. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Mortgages: More Choices, New Risk for Borrowers,
FDIC CONSUMER NEWS, Summer 2005, at 2, 2 http://www.fdic.gov/consumers
/consumer/news/cnsum05/summer_05_bw.pdf (“[M]any new loan products are
being widely offered that could benefit some people but be huge mistakes for
others.”).
29. Dickerson, supra note 1, at 400.
30. See Larry Rohter & Edmund L. Andrews, McCain Rejects Broad U.S. Aid on
Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2008/03/26/us/politics/26mortgage.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2 (quoting Senator
McCain stating that “[s]ome Americans bought homes they couldn’t afford,
betting that rising prices would make it easier to refinance later at more affordable
rates”)
31. Dickerson, supra note 1, at 408.
32. See Christopher Solomon, The Swelling McMansion Backlash, MSN REAL
EST., http://realestate.msn.com/article.aspx?cp-documentid=13107733 (“The
average American home swelled from 983 square feet in 1950 to 2,349 square feet
in 2004—a 140% increase in size.”).
33. See Nicole Gelinas, Sheltering Speculation, CITY J., Oct. 29, 2008,
http://www.city-journal.org/2008/eon1029ng.html.
During 2006, twenty-two
percent of homes were purchased for investment purposes. Les Christie, Homes:
Big Drop in Speculation, CNN MONEY, Apr. 30, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007
/04/30/real_estate/speculators_fleeing_housing_markets/index.htm.
34. See Harvey, supra note 2. Lenders partly protected themselves from
increased risk by charging consumers higher interest rates. Id.
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significant consumer debt with minimal savings set aside as an
35
emergency fund. Worst of all, shady lenders took advantage of
the housing frenzy and began promoting a variety of predatory
36
lending schemes.
Eventually, the risks became too great and borrowers began
37
defaulting. As the number of foreclosed homes started to rise,
property values quickly dropped, reducing or eliminating the home
38
equity many borrowers required in their plan to refinance.
Further complicated by lenders no longer willing to take the same
39
risks they had during the housing boom, coupled with the
aforementioned lack of consumer savings, 2008 foreclosure rates in
40
the United States hit record levels. The financial losses quickly
spread to the rest of the economy and eventually morphed into a
41
national financial crisis.

35. See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 410 (“[C]onsumer debt has grown
exponentially since 1976.”); Kelly Evans, Hard-Hit Families Finally Start Saving,
Aggravating Nation’s Economic Woes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2009, at A1, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123120525879656021.html (stating that during
the last decade many Americans had a negative savings rate—spending more than
they earned—and that economists now expect the savings rate to rebound to three
percent to five percent or higher).
36. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2043–44 (2007) (defining
predatory lending as “a syndrome of loan abuses that benefit mortgage brokers,
lenders, and securitizers to the serious detriment of borrowers”). In states with
weak anti-predatory lending laws, the screening process is often “minimal or
nonexistent.” Id. at 2041.
37. For a discussion of some of the risks taken by national banks, see Levitin,
supra note 4, at 1009.
38. See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 413; FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 25, at
9–12.
39. See generally Dickerson, supra note 1, at 414 (indicating that it became
harder to refinance or borrow once home values began to drop).
40. Id. at 412. By 2008, nearly one in ten mortgages was either past due or in
foreclosure. Id.
41. See id. at 415–16 (noting that the housing crisis had a “catastrophic effect”
on the entire financial industry). President Franklin D. Roosevelt viewed the
housing market as the “wheel within the wheel to move the whole economic
engine.” Matthew D. Ekins, Large-Scale Disasters Attacking the American Dream: How to
Protect and Empower Homeowners and Lenders, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 351, 366
(2008). See also Gjerstad & Smith, supra note 5, at A15 (“[A] financial crisis that
originates in consumer debt, especially consumer debt concentrated at the low
end of the wealth and income distribution, can be transmitted quickly and
forcefully into the financial system.”).
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A Brief History of Foreclosures

The common law principles applicable to mortgages
42
Initially, the
developed in England in the fourteenth century.
mortgagor was treated especially harshly. For example, if a
mortgagor failed to make a required payment on its due date, the
property often reverted to the mortgagee, causing the mortgagor to
43
lose all equity in the property. This is known as strict foreclosure
44
and is almost never used today. To prevent inequitable results,
45
most modern foreclosures involve a public sale of the property.
These sales may be initiated by either judicial or nonjudicial
46
foreclosure in accordance with a state-specific statute. A judicial
foreclosure may be initiated in virtually every state and in twenty47
two states is the only method. Minnesota is among the twenty48
eight states that also allow nonjudicial foreclosure.
Although either judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure
proceedings are allowed in Minnesota, nonjudicial foreclosure,
normally called foreclosure by advertisement, is the preferred
49
method.
Foreclosure by advertisement is a process by which,
42. WILLIAM F. WALSH, A TREATISE ON MORTGAGES §§ 2–3 (1934).
43. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 544 (6th ed. 2006).
44. Id.; see also Gregory R. Henrikson, Perfecting Oregon’s Land Sale Contract:
Beyond Notice and Cure, 76 OR. L. REV. 945, 961 (1997) (“Nationally, strict
foreclosure was already rare by 1929.”).
45. DUKEMINIER, supra note 43, at 544. Strict foreclosure is now prohibited in
all states except Illinois, Vermont, and Connecticut, and only then under certain
limited circumstances. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE
TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 584 (7th ed. 2006); Debra Pogrund Stark,
Facing The Facts: An Empirical Study of the Fairness and Efficiency of Foreclosures and a
Proposal for Reform, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639, 647 (1997).
46. Stark, supra note 45, at 643.
47. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 12 n.6, Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc.,
770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 2009) (No. A08-397) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Brief].
48. Id. Minnesota Statutes section 580.01 also specifies that nonjudicial
foreclosure is only authorized when the mortgage contains a “power of sale”
provision. See also Backus v. Burke, 48 Minn. 260, 267, 51 N.W. 284, 285 (1892)
(“The authority conferred upon a mortgagee to foreclose a mortgage by
advertisement is that found in the power of sale, as that power appears in the
instrument itself . . . .”).
49. See Soufal v. Griffith, 159 Minn. 252, 256, 198 N.W. 807, 809 (1924)
(noting that foreclosure by advertisement was “devised to avoid the delay and
expense of judicial proceedings”) (internal quotations omitted). Amber Hawkins
also stated the following:
Judicial foreclosure is expensive and time consuming for the lenders
because they have to file a lawsuit and get a court order allowing them to
take the property, which is why the lenders almost always choose to
foreclose by advertisement. However, one benefit of judicial foreclosure
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“according to the mortgage instrument and a state statute, the
mortgaged property is sold at a nonjudicial public sale by a public
official . . . without the stringent notice requirements, procedural
50
burdens, or delays of a judicial foreclosure.”
The original
Minnesota foreclosure by advertisement statutes were enacted in
51
1849, the same year Minnesota was established as a territory.
Comparing these statutes with the modern statutes reveals that very
52
little has changed over the past 160 years.
To be in compliance with the foreclosure by advertisement
statute, the following are required: (1) the mortgagor must first
have defaulted on his payment (or have satisfied another condition
giving the mortgagee the power to sell); (2) there must not be any
pending judicial proceeding concerning the mortgage; and (3) the
mortgage, and all assignments thereof, must have been recorded in
53
the county recorder’s office. Additionally, a notice of foreclosure
must be served upon the occupant of the premises and published
in the newspaper for at least six consecutive weeks prior to the
54
sheriff’s sale.
All foreclosure sales must be conducted by the
county sheriff or the sheriff’s deputy, who will issue a “Sheriff’s
Certificate of Sale,” which must be recorded by the purchaser
55
within twenty days of the sale. After the sale, the mortgagor who
was foreclosed on is granted a statutory period in which he may pay

is that it provides a forum where the borrower can ask questions, request
information about their loan, and assert any defenses they may have to
the foreclosure.
Interview with Amber Hawkins, Staff Att’y, Legal Aid Soc’y of Minneapolis, in
Minneapolis, Minn. (July 21, 2010). See also Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 47, at 12
(stating that foreclosure by advertisement deprives the homeowner of a judicial
forum to raise Truth in Lending Act (TILA) defenses, or to challenge the process
in which their home is being foreclosed).
50. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009).
51. See Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 63, §§ 41, 42, 1849 Minn. Laws 139–40.
52. Compare id., with MINN. STAT. §§ 580.02, .04 (2008).
53. MINN. STAT § 580.02.
54. Id. §§ 580.03–.04. Furthermore, because foreclosure by advertisement is a
statutory creation, failure to strictly comply with the statutory requirements
renders the foreclosure void. Moore v. Carlson, 112 Minn. 433, 434, 128 N.W. 578,
579 (1910).
55. MINN. STAT. §§ 580.06, .12. One criticism of the foreclosure process is
that when the lender purchases the foreclosed home they can obtain an unfair
double recovery by bidding less than the debt due and then reselling the property
within one year for more than they bid. Stark, supra note 45, at 665. However,
one empirical study during the last decade shows that this inequity occurs only two
percent of the time. Id. In reality, lenders rarely make any true profit upon resale,
and in most cases suffer a loss. Id. at 664–68.
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56

off the amount necessary to redeem the property. Typically this
period is six months from the date of sale; but it may be up to a
year in situations where a longer period is needed for agricultural
reasons or the mortgagor has satisfied more than one-third of the
57
original principle balance.
The mortgagor may tender the
amount due for redemption to either the foreclosure purchaser or
58
the sheriff on behalf of the foreclosure purchaser.
If the
mortgagor does not tender the amount due within the statutory
redemption period, the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale acts as a
59
conveyance of the property to the foreclosure purchaser.
C.

Development of the Electronic Registration Concept

After generating a loan, the originating lender often sells the
loan on the secondary market to government-sponsored entities
such as the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) or
60
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac).
Alternatively, the originator may assign the loan to an affiliated
61
trust or sell the loan to a loan aggregator or wholesale lender.
After being sold or assigned, the individual loan is often pooled
62
together with hundreds of other loans. If purchased by an entity
such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, they are issued as publicly
63
traded stock, which is then purchased by third-party investors.

56. MINN. STAT. § 580.23.
57. Id. When it is established that the property has been abandoned, the
redemption period may be reduced to five weeks. Id. § 582.032.
58. Id. § 580.24.
59. Id. § 580.12.
60. Hashop v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 171 F.R.D. 208, 210 (N.D. Ill.
1997). The primary market is where the originating financial institution creates
the mortgage loan to the borrower. Id. Often this is done via a third-party
salesperson known as a mortgage broker. Mortgage brokers are typically paid a
fee of between one and three percent of the loan value. James R. Hagerty,
Mortgage Brokers: Friends or Foes?, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2007, available at
http://finance.yahoo.com/loans/article/103075/mortage–brokers-friends-or-foes.
61. Engel & McCoy, supra note 36, at 2045; Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory
Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2209–10 (2007).
62. Hashop, 171 F.R.D. at 210; Peterson, supra note 61, at 2209.
63. See About Fannie Mae, FANNIE MAE, http://www.fanniemae.com/kb/index
?page=home&c=aboutus (last visited Sept. 17, 2010); see also Our Business, FREDDIE
MAC,
http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/company_profile/our_business/
(last visited Sept. 17, 2010) (stating how the process of securitization works).
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If held in an affiliated trust or sold to an intermediary party,
the mortgage pool is typically sold to a Wall Street investment firm
64
known as an “issuer/depositor.”
The issuer/depositor then
assigns the mortgage pool to a trust, and the trust issues mortgagebacked bond certificates to third-party investors with beneficiary
65
interests in the trust. The trust (which technically still owns the
loans) guarantees the third-party investors the return of the loan
principle plus a portion of the interest payments over the life of
66
67
each loan.
The issuer/depositor and the loan servicer also
68
receive a portion of the interest payments. Over the life of a
mortgage, it is common for the loan to be bought and sold several
69
times.
This type of financing is essential to the American
mortgage industry in order to free the capital necessary for the
70
continuing creation of additional loans.
Traditionally, each time a mortgage was sold, the security
71
instrument would be recorded in the public land records.
However, as the secondary mortgage industry became an
increasingly common player, the recordation requirements created
72
a rising tide of paper that began to stifle loan productivity. Loans
64. Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 47, at 5.
65. Id. at 6; accord Hashop, 171 F.R.D. at 210. Government-sponsored entities
such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also issue mortgage-backed securities.
Mortgage-Backed Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov
/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last modified July 23, 2010).
66. Hashop, 171 F.R.D. at 210.
67. A loan servicer is a company that secondary market purchasers hire “to
handle payment processing, tax and insurance escrows, foreclosure and other
matters related to the loan or the property.” Arnold, supra note 10, at 34. In many
cases, the servicer is the loan originator. Id. (noting that a servicing contract does
not represent an interest in the land and thus does not appear in the public land
records).
68. Hashop, 171 F.R.D. at 210.
69. Affidavit of William C. Hultman ¶ 9, Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration
Sys., Inc., No. 08-305, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10798 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2009)
[hereinafter Affidavit of Hultman] (Hultman is the Senior Vice President of
MERSCORP, discussed below). A mortgage note by itself (as opposed to the
combination of a mortgage note and a security instrument) is a negotiable
instrument under U.C.C. section 3-203. Arnold, supra note 10, at 34.
70. See Arnold, supra note 10, at 34 (“Home ownership in most other
countries is far less attainable, largely because financing is not as readily
available.”).
71. See Slesinger & McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 810–11.
72. See id. at 811; see also Arnold, supra note 10, at 34 (“[T]he sheer volume of
transfers between servicing companies and the resulting need to record
assignments caused a heavy drag on the secondary market. The burden affected
lenders, title companies, consumers and even local recorders.”).
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often were traded several times before the first assignment was
recorded, leaving the public land records out of date and “clogged
73
with unnecessary assignments.”
Many times these assignments
74
were recorded in the wrong sequence, creating title problems.
75
In an effort to “streamline the lending process,” the Mortgage
76
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERSCORP) was created.
77
MERSCORP is a “nonstock corporation” currently managed by
78
twenty-six shareholding financial institutions that are also its users.
With the cooperation of the Mortgage Bankers Association of
America and several leading mortgage banking firms, including
several government agencies, MERSCORP developed a secure
computer database to electronically track mortgage assignments for
79
the secondary mortgage industry. This database is known as the
80
MERS System.
The MERS System is modeled after the Depository Trust
Corporation (DTC), which has enabled securities markets to
eliminate paper stock certificates to record the transfer of stocks,
81
bonds, and other securities since the 1970s.
Similarly, the

73. Arnold, supra note 10, at 34.
74. Id. (stating that error rates as high as thirty-three percent were common).
See, e.g., Cocheo, supra note 12, at 48 (noting that prior to the MERS System,
discussed below, the process of recording multiple assignments added up to a
“massive paperwork challenge” such that, by one industry estimate, “it can cost as
much as $250,000 to clean up assignment problems relating to a single block of
2,500 loans”).
75. This phrase is used by Carson Mullen. See Carson Mullen, MERS:
Tracking Loans Electronically, ALLBUSINESS (May 1, 2000), http://www.allbusiness.com
/finance/3594162-1.html.
76. See Arnold, supra note 10, at 33; see also MERS’s Brief and Addendum at 3,
Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 2009) (No.
A08-397) [hereinafter MERS’s Brief] (stating that the severe title problems created
during the savings and loan crisis were one of the main catalysts for the creation of
MERS). MERS was conceived in 1993 and incorporated in 1995, becoming fully
operational in 1997. See Arnold, supra note 10, at 33.
77. Arnold, supra note 10Error! Bookmark not defined., at 33.
78. Brandt, supra note 13. MERSCORP is registered in Delaware and
headquartered in Virginia. Peterson, supra note 61, at 2211.
79. Arnold, supra note 10, at 33; Peterson, supra note 61, at 2211.
80. Affidavit of Hultman, supra note 69, ¶ 2. MERS members, including some
3100 mortgage lenders and secondary market investors, pay the membership dues
necessary to maintain this database. See id.; Peterson, supra note 61, at 2211; see
also Arnold, supra note 10, at 34 (“[A]nnual membership fees currently range
from $500 to $7,500, depending on a member’s size and types of business.”).
81. Arnold, supra note 10, at 35 (“[The DTC] revolutionized the way
securities are traded.”); see also Mullen, supra note 75 (“The Depository Trust
Corporation (DTC), of New York City, provided a good model.”).
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creation of the MERS System reduces paper recording in the
82
mortgage industry, greatly simplifying property chains of title.
The concept works by MERS acting as the “nominal mortgagee
of record” for the MERS member/lender or secondary mortgage
83
investor who actually owns the debt.
In other words, MERS
doesn’t own the debt obligation, but it keeps track of who does. All
the while, MERS is listed in the public land records as the party
holding the security interest in the property, but only as a stand-in
84
for the true owner of the debt.
MERS becomes the nominal mortgagee of record in one of
two ways: (1) the borrower and lender designate MERS as the
nominal mortgagee of record at the time the mortgage loan is
originated, or (2) the mortgagee of record for an existing loan
85
Ideally, MERS then
subsequently assigns the record to MERS.
86
remains mortgagee of record throughout the life of the loan.
When loans are transferred, an assignment of the promissory note
is executed electronically within the MERS System, but the security
instrument remains registered with MERS in the county recorder’s
87
office. Considering that there are no means available to publicly
record assignments of the promissory notes alone, the MERS
88
System technically supplements the public land recording system.
As an additional benefit to vastly improving the accuracy of land
records, the MERS System also significantly reduces the transaction
82. Arnold, supra note 10, at 35; see also id. at 33 (“Some have called MERS the
most significant event for the mortgage industry since the formation of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac.”).
83. See Peterson, supra note 61, at 2211; see also Slesinger & McLaughlin, supra
note 9, at 806–7) (“Consistent with mortgage participations where a lead
participant holds legal title on behalf of the other participants, and with secondary
market transactions where mortgage servicers hold legal title on behalf of their
investors, MERS will serve as mortgagee of record in a nominee capacity only.”).
This eliminates the need to record each assignment of the promissory note.
Slesinger & McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 806–7.
84. See Brandt, supra note 13.
85. Affidavit of Hultman, supra note 69, ¶ 5.
86. Arnold, supra note 10, at 34.
87. Id. However, when changing loan servicers, the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (RESPA) requires both the old and new servicer to notify the
homeowner in writing when loan servicing is traded. 12 U.S.C. § 2605 (2006).
These notifications are commonly called “hello/goodbye letters.” Arnold, supra
note 10, at 34.
88. See MERS’s Brief, supra note 76, at 9 (“MERS thus fills an information void
that the county recorders and registrars of title cannot provide—the identity of the
servicer of the mortgage loan, which is not required to be recorded in
Minnesota.”).
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costs and filing fees that had previously been associated with
preparing and recording the security interest in the public land
89
records each time the loan was sold.
Since its inception, MERS has grown substantially. MERS now
operates in all fifty states and the District of Columbia, and is
regularly accepted as nominal mortgagee of record by over 3000
county clerks and county recorders throughout the United States,
90
including all eighty-seven counties in Minnesota. Over the course
91
of the last decade, MERS registration has grown very rapidly.
MERS is the current mortgagee on approximately sixty million
92
mortgage loans, which represents roughly sixty percent of all
93
newly originated mortgages nationwide.
In Hennepin County,
MERS is listed as the mortgagee of record “on at least half of all
94
new mortgage filings.”
D.

A Glitch in the System

Although the MERS System was specifically “designed to
operate within the existing legal framework in all U.S.
jurisdictions,” defending the MERS concept has been a continuous
95
uphill battle. The problem is that mortgage documentation in
America is bifurcated into the promissory note and security
89. Joint Brief of Am. Land Title Ass’n et. al. as Amici Curiae for Defendant
at 4–5, Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn.
2009) (No. 08-305) [hereinafter Amici for MERS].
90. Affidavit of Hultman, supra note 69, ¶ 32; see also MERSCORP, Inc. v.
Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 85 (N.Y. 2006) (affirming a ministerial duty ordering the
county clerk to record and index instruments in which MERS is mortgagee of
record).
91. See Peterson, supra note 61, at 2211 n.161 (stating that in 2001, the total
number of loan registrations within the MERS System was less than just five
percent of all loans nationwide; and in the following years, MERS experienced
growth rates of nearly two-hundred percent). The MERSCORP Website touts
“[o]ur mission is to register every mortgage loan in the United States on the
MERS® System.” About MERS, MERS, http://www.mersinc.org/about/index.aspx
(last visited Aug. 2, 2010).
92. Mike McIntire, Tracking Loans Through a Firm That Holds Millions, N.Y
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/24
/business/24mers.html?_r=1&ref=mortgage_electronic_registration_systems_inc.
93. Karmela Lejarde, SunTrust Becomes Third Major Mortgage Provider in Recent
Months to Require MERS® System, MERS (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.mersinc.org
/newsroom/press_details.aspx?id=235; see also Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration
Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 491–92 (Minn. 2009).
94. Brandt, supra note 13 (paraphrasing comment by Mike Cunniff, the
Hennepin County Recorder and Registrar of Titles).
95. Arnold, supra note 10, at 35.
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instrument. Historically, these two parts could not be separated.
The MERS concept is based on two ideas: (1) every state
permits a nominee to hold legal title in the public land records for
98
another person, and (2) the “mortgage follows the note.”
Consequently, the rights to the security interest in the land will
99
naturally follow each time a debt is assigned.
However, quite
possibly, using these two notions in conjunction was never
100
A leading treatise on mortgage law states the
contemplated.
following:
[S]ecurity is worthless in the hands of anyone except a
person who has the right to enforce the obligation; it
cannot be foreclosed or otherwise enforced. . . .
[Separating the security interest from the debt] will leave
one person with an unsecured debt and the other with a
101
security instrument that cannot be enforced.
Thus, the modern day concept of the MERS System detracts from
the authority of the common law rule.
Minnesota real estate professionals foresaw this derogation as a
potential roadblock to real estate transactions and banded together
102
to find a common solution.
The solution came in the form of
96. Dale A. Whitman, Chinese Mortgage Law: An American Perspective, 15 COLUM.
J. ASIAN L. 35, 62 (2001) (noting that bifurcation derives from historic English
traditions).
97. Affidavit of Ann Burkhart ¶ 3, Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys.,
Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 2009) (No. 08-305) [hereinafter Affidavit of
Burkhart].
98. Arnold, supra note 10, at 34–35.
99. Id. at 34.
100. See Brandt, supra note 13. MERS represents “an off-record system which
the statute didn’t contemplate.” Id. (quoting Rick Little, the former Deputy
Examiner of Titles for Hennepin County).
101. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 15, § 5.27; see also Affidavit of Burkhart,
supra note 977 ¶ 3 (citing Nelson & Whitman in her assertion that mortgage
bifurcation is a derogation to the common law). But see MERS’s Brief, supra note
76, at 32 (stating that despite the common law rule that a promissory note and
security interest should not be separated, “[t]here is no requirement under
Minnesota law that the mortgagee of record and the beneficial owner of the
mortgage loan must be the same entity . . . .”) (emphasis added).
102. See MERS’s Brief, supra note 76, at 13 (stating that “the real property
section of the Minnesota State and County Bar Associations, the Registrar of Title
for Hennepin and Ramsey Counties, and other Minnesota county recorders’
offices” worked together to address the MERS title problem). See also Interview
with Chuck Hoyum, Chief Underwriting Counsel, Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins.
Co., in Minneapolis, Minn. (July 20, 2010) (stating also that Minnesota is blessed
in that, unlike many other states, the property law community here works
particularly well together).
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Minnesota Statutes section 507.413, commonly referred to as the
103
“MERS statute,” which was intended to officially recognize MERS
104
as a nominee of record.
Specifically, the statute grants nominal
mortgagees of record the authority to record assignments,
105
The
satisfactions, releases, and powers of attorney to foreclose.
statute applies to all instruments executed, recorded, or filed
106
before, on, or after August 1, 2004.
Just two years later, the Minnesota Court of Appeals heard In re
107
Sina,
where a couple sought to void the foreclosure sale
108
conducted by MERS for their home in Champlin, Minnesota. In
December 2002, David and Candice Sina financed their new home
with a mortgage originated by Maribella Mortgage, LLC
(Maribella), and the mortgage was recorded in the Hennepin
County land records with Maribella listed as the mortgagee of
109
record.
Subsequently, MERS was assigned as the nominal
mortgagee of record and the debt was sold on the secondary
110
By June 2003, the
market to Aurora Loan Services, Inc. (ALS).
111
Sinas had become delinquent on their mortgage payments.
Shortly thereafter, MERS initiated foreclosure by advertisement
proceedings, which culminated in a sheriff’s sale of the property in
112
November 2003.

103. Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 491
(Minn. 2009).
104. See Act of Apr. 6, 2004, ch. 153, § 2, 2004 Minn. Laws 76, 76–77 (codified
at MINN. STAT. § 507.413 (2008)); Audio tape: Mortgage Satisfaction Certificates
and Assignments or Releases, Hearing on S.F. 1621 Before S. Judiciary Comm.,
83rd Legislative Session (Feb. 10, 2004) (on file at the Minnesota Legislative
Reference Library) [hereinafter Hearing on S.F. 1621]; Mortgage Satisfaction
Certificates and Assignments or Releases: Hearing on H.F. 1805 Before the H. Civ. Law
Comm., 2003–2004 Leg., 83rd Sess. (Minn. 2004) (statement of Chuck Parsons, at
9:07; and statement of Rep. Thomas Pugh, at 13:10), audio available at
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/audio/archivescomm.asp?comm=4&ls_year=83
(follow “Listen Now” hyperlink under “Civil Law” and “Tuesday, February 3,
2004”). MERS was, however, referenced in connection with the statute. Id.
105. MINN. STAT. § 507.413.
106. Id.
107. No. A06-200, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1094 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept.
26, 2006).
108. Id. at *1–2.
109. Id. at *2.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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Believing that MERS had not complied with the Fair Debt
113
Collection Practices Act, the Sinas brought an action in state
114
court to void the foreclosure and vacate the sale. MERS removed
the case to federal court, where the court granted summary
115
The Sinas appealed to the Eighth Circuit,
judgment for MERS.
116
which affirmed the district court’s decision.
The Sinas then
amended their original complaint, again bringing the action in
state court, alleging that MERS, acting as nominee for ALS, did not
fulfill the foreclosure requirements necessitated by Minnesota state
117
law.
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that
MERS had standing to foreclose and met the statutory
requirements of foreclosure by advertisement; affirming what each
118
of the previous courts had determined.
It would seem that this case properly addressed the observed
derogation, filling in with common law situations (such as
foreclosure), that which was either ambiguous or omitted by the
119
MERS statute.
However, the plaintiffs’ expert witness in Jackson
113. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)–(p) (2006).
114. In re Sina, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1094, at *7.
115. Id.
116. Sina v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 124 F. App’x 479 (8th Cir. 2005).
117. In re Sina, at *8.
118. Id. at *5–6. The court also determined that even if MERS had violated
state law, res judicata barred vacating the foreclosure sale because the Sinas’
amended claim arose from the same operative facts that had been the subject of
previous litigation. Id. at *7–8.
119. In re Sina was just one of many similar lawsuits that were filed across the
country prior to Jackson. The majority of jurisdictions favored MERS’s standing to
foreclose as nominee of record, but unlike In re Sina and Jackson, many of the cases
involved MERS’s authority to appear in court on behalf of the MERS members,
not to foreclose by advertisement. See Trent v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc.,
288 F. App’x 571, 572 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that MERS has standing to
foreclose as nominee for lender); Morgera v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No.
2:09-cv-1476-MCE-GGH, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2037, at *21 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12,
2010) (stating that the majority of courts have found that MERS has standing to
foreclose as the nominee of the lender); Hilmon v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys.,
Inc., No. 06-13055, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29578, at *8–9 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 23,
2007) (finding that MERS does not need to hold the note to foreclose and that
borrower expressly gave MERS right to foreclose as nominee); In re Huggins, 357
B.R. 180, 183 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006) (finding that MERS had authority to conduct
a foreclosure by power of sale under Massachusetts law); Mortg. Elec. Registration
Sys., Inc. v. Ventura, No. CV054003168S, 2006 Conn. LEXIS 1154, at *3 (Super.
Ct. Apr. 20, 2006) (finding that “there is no question that [MERS] is the correct
party to bring this [foreclosure] action”); Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v.
Revoredo, 955 So. 2d 33, 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that the clear
majority of cases support MERS’s standing to maintain mortgage foreclosure
proceedings); Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Azize, 965 So. 2d 151, 153–54
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noted that Sina is an unpublished decision, and is thus without
120
She also noted that the Sinas were not
precedential value.
121
represented by legal counsel. Therefore, Sina only represented a
temporary fix to any gaps not expressly covered by the MERS
statute. Given the high rate of foreclosures in the years that
followed, it was only a matter of time before MERS’s ability to
122
foreclose in Minnesota was challenged again.
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that a party seeking to foreclose need not be
beneficial owner of the note); MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 84
(N.Y. 2006) (holding that the county clerk must accept the MERS assignments and
discharges of mortgage for recording). But see In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511, 516
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that without knowing the identity of the
beneficial owner of the note, MERS lacked standing to obtain stay relief in court);
Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Sw. Homes of Ark., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 1, 5
(Ark. 2009) (finding that MERS held no authority to act as an agent for
foreclosure because they held no interest in the land); Landmark Nat’l Bank v.
Kesler, 192 P.3d 177, 179–80 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that MERS was not the
true mortgagee but rather an agent of the true mortgagee because mortgage
stated MERS was “solely” nominee); Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Neb.
Dep’t of Banking & Fin., 704 N.W.2d 784, 787–88 (Neb. 2005) (MERS does not
acquire mortgage loans as defined under state law and, therefore, it is not subject
to the requirements of the Act).
120. Affidavit of Burkhart, supra note 97, ¶ 7. See also Vlahos v. R&I Constr. of
Bloomington, Inc., 676 N.W.2d 672, 676 n.3 (Minn. 2004) (“[W]e pause here to
stress that unpublished opinions of the court of appeals are not precedential. The
danger of miscitation is great because unpublished decisions rarely contain a full
recitation of the facts. Unpublished decisions should not be cited by the district
courts as binding precedent.”) (citations omitted); State ex rel. Hatch v. Emp’rs
Ins. of Wausau, 644 N.W.2d 820, 828 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (“We remind courts
that our unpublished opinions are [a]t best of persuasive value and are not
controlling.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
121. Affidavit of Burkhart, supra note 97, ¶ 7. Although the opinion indicates
that David Sina represented himself pro se, In re Sina, No. A06-200, 2006 Minn.
LEXIS 1094, at *1 (Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2006), David Sina possesses a J.D. degree
from William Mitchell and claims to have at least thirty years of experience in
construction law.
See Dave Sina’s Biography, FIVE STAR LEGAL SERVICES,
http://sinalegalservices.com/biography.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2010).
122. Not long after In re Sina, foreclosure rates in the United States hit record
levels. See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 396. In the Minneapolis-Saint Paul
metropolitan area, MERS was the mortgagee of record in approximately forty
percent of all foreclosures. See Brandt, supra note 13. See also FISHBEIN &
WOODALL, supra note 25, at 1 (“There has been a proliferation of new mortgage
products in recent years.”); Michael Grover, Fed-Led Research Reveals Need For Better
DIVIDEND,
Sept.
2006,
Twin
Cities
Foreclosure
Data,
COMMUNITY
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=2200
(“MERS-related loan volume is growing quickly. When the researchers compared
later records with the foreclosure sales records from 2002, the portion of
foreclosure sale documents with MERS listed as the lender was much larger, with
over one-third of the foreclosure sales in Hennepin County alone in 2005.”).
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III. SUMMARY OF THE CASE
A.

Background

In the barest sense, the plaintiffs in Jackson v. Mortgage Electronic
123
Registration Systems, Inc. could be described as five individuals who
collectively borrowed nearly one million dollars from various
lenders and, for one reason or another, did not comply with their
124
loan obligations.
However, telling each plaintiff’s story not only
better describes the background of this case, it also paints a clearer
picture of what led America into the mess we found ourselves in
just a few short years ago.
Jewelean Jackson and her daughter lived in a house in North
125
Minneapolis since 1991 in what has long been regarded as a
126
rough neighborhood.
Early in 2004, Jackson’s home, which was
127
in severe disrepair, was condemned by the City of Minneapolis.
Shortly thereafter, Jackson missed several mortgage payments and
128
the property was sold at a foreclosure sale. At the time, she owed
129
approximately $40,000 on the mortgage.
Sometime after the mortgage foreclosure sale, Jackson was
approached by a real estate agent-investor who offered to help her
130
keep the property. After Jackson accepted his help, the investor
paid roughly $45,000 to redeem the property and arranged for the

123. Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn.
2009).
124. See MERS’s Brief, supra note 76, at 2.
125. Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶ 40, Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc.,
No. 08-305, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10798 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2008) [hereinafter
Complaint]; Affidavit of Jewelean Jackson in Support of Motion for Temporary
Injunction ¶ 1, Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 08-305, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10798 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2008) [hereinafter Affidavit of Jackson].
126. See, e.g., Minneapolis Police Dep’t, Fourth Precinct Other Tracked Offenses: January
6, 2008–January 12, 2009, http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/crime-statistics
/codefor/maps/572_Pct4_OtherC4Offenses.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2010)
(depicting high crime activity in North Minneapolis); City Pages Staff, North Side
Story: This Year the Murder Rate Has Doubled in North Minneapolis. What’s Changed?
Nothing, Really. That’s the Trouble., CITY PAGES, Aug. 25, 2004, available at
http://www.citypages.com/2004-08-25/news/north-side-story (“In June, the
residential street erupted in violence. An ice-cream man was shot during a
botched robbery involving just $40. Later that month, a teenager involved in gang
activity was shot three times in the leg.”).
127. Complaint, supra note 125, ¶ 41.
128. Id. ¶ 42.
129. Id. ¶ 41.
130. Id. ¶ 43.
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131

necessary repairs to the house to lift the condemnation order.
132
Jackson moved out while the repairs were in progress.
Early 2006, the investor informed Jackson that the repairs were
133
complete and that it was time to compensate him for his services.
The investor arranged a meeting with a mortgage broker and
guided Jackson through the loan application process, which
resulted in her obligation to a thirty-year ARM with a principle
134
The initial annual interest rate began at
balance of $229,500.
8.9% and after six months became adjustable to a maximum of
135
15.9%.
Additionally, the amortization schedule was based on a
forty-five year term; thus, after making thirty years of payments
Jackson would be required to make a balloon payment of
136
approximately $160,000. For his services, the investor would have
137
received a payoff of $215,317.
David Williams purchased his home in South Minneapolis,
where he had lived and cared for his eighty-two-year-old uncle since
138
1989. Williams, despite only being able to read at a fourth grade
139
level, was employed and consistently paid his mortgage for twenty
140
However, in 2006, Williams responded to an internet
years.
141
survey that promised him a free gift. Within hours of filling out
the survey, Williams was contacted by a mortgage broker who
142
offered to refinance his existing mortgage. Williams was told the
new loan would be about the same interest rate as his current loan,
143
and as an added bonus he could obtain some cash out. Needing
money to make repairs on the home and pay off consumer debt,
144
As a result, Williams ended up with two new
Williams agreed.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. ¶ 44.
134. Affidavit of Jackson, supra note 125, ¶¶ 2–3.
135. Complaint, supra note 125, ¶ 49.
136. Id.
137. Id. ¶¶ 43, 45 (“Many of the repairs done to the home were shoddy and
unprofessional.”).
138. Complaint, supra note 125, ¶¶ 86–87.
139. Affidavit of David Williams ¶ 3, Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys.,
Inc., No. 08-305, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10798 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2008)
[hereinafter Affidavit of Williams].
140. Interview with Amber Hawkins, supra note 49. Hawkins was the colead
attorney for the plaintiffs.
141. Id. ¶ 4.
142. See id. ¶ 4.
143. Id. ¶ 7.
144. Id. ¶ 6.
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mortgages: one for $192,000 and a junior mortgage for an
145
additional $48,000. The first mortgage was a thirty-year ARM with
146
an initial annual interest rate of 8.125%.
Like Jackson’s loan, the payments were based on a forty-five
147
Thus, after thirty years Williams
year amortization schedule.
148
would still owe a balance of over $162,000. The junior mortgage
was a thirty-year fixed at the rate of 11.125%, with payments based
149
At the closing,
on a forty-year year amortization schedule.
Williams was presented with many documents that he could neither
150
read nor understand.
These documents and the terms of the
151
Unable to keep up
mortgages were never correctly explained.
with the new payments, Williams’s home eventually went into
152
foreclosure, and was purchased by MERS in November 2007.
Brenda Doane, a single mother of two, purchased her home in
153
Richfield in 2004, where she was employed as a dental assistant.
154
Early in 2007, Doane lost her job. She searched for a new job to
no avail, and within months she fell behind in her mortgage
155
payments.
Eventually, her home went into foreclosure and was
156
sold to MERS in July 2007.
Ethylon and William Brown purchased their home in
157
Southwest Minneapolis in 2007.
Rather than selling their old
home, the couple decided to keep their previous residence as an
158
However, not long after their first renters
investment property.
159
moved in, they stopped paying rent.
After evicting the renters,
160
Eventually, the
the property was vacant for several months.
145. See Complaint, supra note 125, ¶¶ 96, 99 n.9.
146. Id. ¶ 96.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. ¶ 99 n.9.
150. Affidavit of Williams, supra note 139, ¶ 8.
151. Complaint, supra note 125, ¶ 93.
152. See id. ¶ 102.
153. Id. ¶ 70.
154. Affidavit of Brenda Doane ¶ 4, Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys.,
Inc., No. 08-305, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10798 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2008).
155. Id. ¶ 4; Complaint, supra note 125, ¶ 77.
156. See Complaint, supra note 125, ¶¶ 78, 83.
157. See id. ¶ 63.
158. Interview with Amber Hawkins, supra note 49; see Affidavit of Ethylon B.
Brown ¶ 5, Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 08-305, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10798 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2008).
159. Interview with Amber Hawkins, supra note 49; see Affidavit of Brown, supra
note 158, ¶ 6.
160. Interview with Amber Hawkins, supra note 49; see Affidavit of Brown, supra
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couple’s savings dried up and they missed several mortgage
161
Shortly after, both of their properties went into
payments.
foreclosure, and the Browns’ new home was sold at a sheriff’s sale
162
in February, 2008.
Thus, each plaintiff arrived at financial troubles in different
ways. However, each of their stories is shared by thousands of
163
164
others, both in Minnesota and around the country. Whether by
an
equity-stripping
scheme,
shady
lending
practices,
unemployment, or over-reliance on a booming housing market
with too little cash savings, the common element among the
plaintiffs was that their mortgages were held by MERS as a nominee
165
of record.
Moreover, following default, it was MERS that
166
instituted the foreclosure by advertisement proceedings.
B.

District Court

Banding together in an effort to prevent losing their homes,
the plaintiffs filed a class action suit in state court claiming that
MERS violated Minnesota property law by foreclosing mortgages by
advertisement without the proper recordation of all mortgage
167
assignments. Accordingly, the plaintiffs sought to restrain MERS
from commencing any further nonjudicial foreclosures without
first recording assignments and from evicting homeowners
168
following the redemption period on MERS-initiated foreclosures.
169
MERS responded by removing the case to federal court.
Believing the likelihood of the plaintiffs’ success at trial to be slight,

note 158, ¶¶ 6–7.
161. Interview with Amber Hawkins, supra note 49; see Complaint, supra note
125, ¶ 64.
162. Complaint, supra note 125, ¶¶ 65–66; Affidavit of Brown, supra note 158,
¶¶ 7, 10.
163. See, e.g., Ford Fesseden, The American Dream Foreclosed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
2007,
available
at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9A0CEFDE1038F937A25753C1A9619C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all.
164. See Interview with Amber Hawkins, supra note 49; see also Prentiss Cox,
Foreclosure Reform Amid Mortgage Lending Turmoil: A Public Purpose Approach, 45
HOUS. L. REV. 683, 688 (2008) (describing the scope and magnitude of the
foreclosure crisis).
165. See Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 08-305, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10798, at *6 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2008).
166. Id. at *7.
167. Id. at *1–2.
168. See id. at *2.
169. Id. at *1.
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170

the district court denied a temporary injunction.
In contemplation of a permanent injunction, the court
realized that the dispositive issue in the case concerned the
171
interpretation of Minnesota state law.
Furthermore, in addition
to being novel and likely to reoccur, the court also recognized that
the class action suit sought sweeping relief and had arrived in
federal court solely on the basis of diversity rather than being a
172
The district court therefore certified the
federal question.
following question for the Minnesota Supreme Court:
Where an entity, such as defendant MERS, serves as
mortgagee of record as nominee for a lender and that
lender’s successors and assigns and there has been no
assignment of the mortgage itself, is an assignment of the
ownership of the underlying indebtedness for which the
mortgage serves as security an assignment that must be
recorded prior to the commencement of a mortgage
173
foreclosure by advertisement under Minn. Stat. ch. 580?
C.

Minnesota Supreme Court—the Majority Decision

In answering this question, the court first looked to the
foreclosure by advertisement statutes, ultimately determining that a
phrase within the statute unambiguously distinguished a
“mortgage” (i.e., the instrument used to secure a debt) as separate
174
from the “debt” itself (represented by the promissory note).
Since, according to the statute, only recordation of the “mortgage”
is required, MERS, as the continuous record holder of the security
175
interest, was in full compliance.

The court next considered the effect of the traditional concept
170. See id. at *2, *4–12.
171. See Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 08-305, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14785, at *5 (D. Minn. Feb. 27, 2010) (“In a federal system, it is
obviously desirable that questions of law which . . . are both intensely local and
immensely important to a wide spectrum of state government activities be decided
in the first instance by state courts.”) (quoting Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 662
n.16 (1978)).
172. Id. at *4.
173. Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 489
(Minn. 2009) (stating the Minnesota Supreme Court’s reformulation of the
district court’s certified question).
174. Id. at 496; see MINN. STAT. §§ 580.02, .04 (2008).
175. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 496.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss1/3

22

Hansen: Property: Innovations to Historic Legal Traditions—Jackson v. Mor

2010]

JACKSON V. MERS

377

176

that “the mortgage follows the note.”
In short, each time a
promissory note is assigned, an equitable interest in the mortgage
177
is created in the assignee.
Thus, the question was whether this
change in equitable interest of the mortgage required
178
Case history indicated that the “manifest purpose”
recordation.
of the recording requirement was “to make the title to the
mortgage [a] matter of record,” thus creating certainty of
179
ownership;
however, the requirement is not one of
180
“supertechnical niceties and details of description.”
Therefore,
the court has never required the recording of equitable interests to
181
be in compliance with the foreclosure by advertisement process.
Last, the plaintiffs contended that because MERS acted only as
nominee for MERS members, they did not actually hold legal title
182
to the mortgage. They claimed that legal title was actually held by
the MERS member who was assigned the debt; thus, each time the
debt was assigned, legal title transferred, which required
183
recordation.
But the court held that this argument also failed
because it has been established that assignment of a debt did not
184
affect legal title to the security interest.
Therefore, the court
found that MERS properly held both record and legal title to each
185
of the plaintiff’s mortgages.

Finally, the court verified MERS’s authority to foreclose,
stating that “the power of sale must be exercised in the name of the
176. Id. at 497; see also First Nat’l Bank v. Pope, 85 Minn. 433, 434, 89 N.W. 318,
318 (1902); Affidavit of Burkhart, supra note 97, ¶ 3 (footnote omitted) (quoting
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 15, § 5.27) (“The security [mortgage] is virtually
inseparable from the obligation unless the parties to the transfer expressly agree
to separate them.”).
177. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 497.
178. See id.
179. Id. (quoting Morrison v. Mendenhall, 18 Minn. 232, 236 (1872)).
180. Id. at 498 (quoting Soufal v. Griffith, 159 Minn. 252, 255–56, 198 N.W.
807, 808–9 (1924)).
181. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 498; see also Morrison, 18 Minn. at 237 (stating that a
“mere equitable” interest does not require recordation to be in compliance with
the statutes).
182. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 498.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 499 (“[I]t is possible for a party to hold legal title in the security
instrument . . . without holding an interest in the promissory note.”); see also
Wilson v. Hayes, 40 Minn. 531, 42 N.W. 467 (1889) (holding that a promissory
note did not affect legal title in the mortgage).
185. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 499.
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186

party who has the legal title.” Accordingly, the certified question
187
was answered in the negative.
D.

The Dissent

In his dissent, however, Justice Alan Page believed that MERS
188
had not complied with the foreclosure by advertisement statutes.
The statutes state that foreclosure by advertisement is not available
189
until “all assignments . . . have been recorded.”
Thus, when the
majority acknowledged that each transfer of debt also conferred an
190
assignment of equitable interest in the mortgage, Justice Page
concluded that, to be in compliance, this equitable interest must
191
also be recorded.
IV. ARGUMENT
A.

What About the MERS Statute?
192

As mentioned previously, by passing the MERS statute, the
legislature appears to have officially recognized MERS and
expressly approved MERS’s authority to record mortgage
193
instruments on behalf of its members.
Ever since this
amendment took effect, MERS has contended that because the
Minnesota Legislature gave its blessing to the MERS concept, the
statute naturally extended to foreclosure by advertisement
194
proceedings.
However, the plaintiffs referred to this perceived
extension as a “sweeping exception to the requirements of the
195
foreclosure by advertisement statute.”
Ultimately, the court did
196
not agree with the plaintiffs.
186. Id. at 500 (quoting Burke v. Backus, 51 Minn. 174, 179, 53 N.W. 458, 459
(1892)).
187. Id. at 503.
188. See id. (Page, J., dissenting).
189. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting MINN. STAT. § 580.02(3) (2008)).
190. Id. at 494.
191. See id.; see, e.g., Moore v. Carlson, 112 Minn. 433, 434, 128 N.W. 578, 579
(1910) (stating that because foreclosure by advertisement is a statutory creation,
the foreclosing party must “must show an exact and literal compliance with its
terms”).
192. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
193. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 494.
194. See MERS’s Brief, supra note 76, at 18–19.
195. Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief at 9, Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc.,
770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 2009) (No. A08-397) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief].
196. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 495.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss1/3

24

Hansen: Property: Innovations to Historic Legal Traditions—Jackson v. Mor

2010]

JACKSON V. MERS

379

Most convincing is what is not in the legislative history of
section 507.413. There is no discussion of MERS’s right to
foreclose by advertisement and very little indication that the
legislature intended its blessing to extend beyond the authority of
197
recording mortgage instruments. The plaintiffs contended that it
is the legislature’s duty alone to determine whether or not the
198
MERS statute also confers the right to foreclose.
The plaintiffs further contended that when the foreclosure by
advertisement statutes were enacted, the legislature never intended
to allow “an entity with as little interest as MERS to act as a straw
man to hide the chain of assignments of a mortgage loan in
199
foreclosure.” Construing section 507.413 to allow MERS the right
to foreclose as nominal mortgagee would defeat the purpose of the
foreclosure by advertisement statutes by allowing assignments of
200
the mortgage to no longer be a part of the public record.
The
plaintiffs maintained that the legislature enacted the MERS statute
201
as a recording act solely to grant MERS the authority to record.
Thus, plaintiffs argued, when a MERS member decided to initiate
foreclosure proceedings, MERS had the ability to update the
security instrument by tracing the chain of custody of the note and
to file corresponding mortgage assignments in the county
202
recording office to be in compliance with the foreclosure statutes.
MERS, however, contended that this logic gave way to
203
inconsistent results.
After all, MERS argued, if the requirement

197. Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 47, at 35–36; see Hearing on S.F. 1621, supra
note 104. This possibly is the case because when the bill was passed in 2004,
property values were increasing rapidly and foreclosure rates were relatively low.
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
198. See Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief, supra note 195, at 9 (“[The] legislature alone
should determine whether the convenience and cost savings for MERS and its
members justify such a fundamental change.”).
199. Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 47, at 32. To be clear, when legal title to the
mortgage and note are separated, there is no method of recording besides the
MERS System that determines who maintains the right to foreclose on the
promissory note. Interview with Chuck Hoyum, supra note 102 (“Only the security
interest is recorded in the land recording office . . . not the note, and certainly not
assignments of the note.”).
200. Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 47, at 35.
201. See Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 495 (“[A] Recording Act creates no obligations;
rather, it uses recording to resolve disputes between parties who have no
contractual relationship, but who lay claim to the same title.”).
202. Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 47, at 35.
203. MERS’s Brief, supra note 76, at 19.
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to record assignments was to make transfers of the debt a matter of
public record, then why shouldn’t the ninety-eight percent of
mortgagors who honor their debt obligations have also benefited
204
from this requirement?
MERS stated that under the plaintiffs’
analysis, only those who failed to honor their debt obligations
205
benefited from this interpretation of the MERS statute.
Ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that the
MERS statute represented the legislature’s approval of the MERS
concept, but because the amendment was technically a recording
statute and never specifically addressed foreclosure, the court
206
refused MERS the authority to foreclose by advertisement.
B.

Hiding Behind an Opaque Corporate Wall

A common theme that seems to unite all of the plaintiffs
among the different jurisdictions who have brought suits against
MERS was their belief that MERS helped to facilitate the mortgage
207
crisis.
A number of lawyers and academics claimed that the
MERS System served as nothing more than an “opaque corporate
208
that
wall” hiding the true owner of the mortgage loan,
MERSCORP was simply a corporate-driven “profit-engine” for the
209
mortgage industry, and that this wall provided an impenetrable
210
shield for the wealthy investors who controlled the capital.
Academics also argued that plaintiffs in different jurisdiction
can also claim that in the heyday of shady lending practices, thinly
financed loan originators would be used as “disposable filter[s]” for
211
Wall Street investment firms.
The theory was that after a
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 495.
207. See Mark A. Cohen, Foreclosure Challenge is Rebuffed by Minnesota Supreme
Court, MINN. LAWYER, Aug. 17, 2009, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/legal
/legal-services-litigation/12687396-1.html (“The rapid and careless expansion of
mortgage loan sales on the secondary market is a well recognized cause to the
current financial meltdown . . . .”) (quoting Amber Hawkins).
208. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 61, at 2266.
209. Brief for South Brooklyn Legal Services et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellant at 46, MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81 (N.Y. 2006) (No.
179), available at http://4closurefraud.org/2010/06/09/amicus-brief-challengingmers-standing-to-foreclose [hereinafter Amici for Romaine].
210. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 36, at 2041.
211. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 61, at 2275 (“If Wall Street firms use the
tools of structured finance to knowingly or recklessly facilitate and profit from
predatory lending, surely they are as responsible as the fly-by-night brokers,
originators, and servicers they capitalize.”); see id. at 2273 (“The lending entities
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predatory lender made a loan, the debt would quickly be sold via
212
This
MERS to the lender’s financier on the secondary market.
practice would continue while claims against the predatory lender
213
accumulated.
When enough lawsuits mounted to make the
scheme unprofitable, the lender would simply declare bankruptcy
214
and close up shop.
All the while, the bulk of the capital in this
operation was held securely by an unknown party in the secondary
215
market—with MERS serving as a shield.
In the dissent, Justice Page noted that being unable to identify
who owns a debt also precludes a number of defenses under the
216
Truth in Lending Act (TILA). After the trial, the plaintiffs’ lead
attorney, Amber Hawkins, stated that “[a]s a result of the court’s
decision, an agent with no responsibility or authority related to the
loan can foreclose upon a homeowner through an expedited non[217
]judicial process without identifying who it is working for.”
She
claimed that because the MERS concept was developed to avoid
recording laws, the result is a private structure that conceals crucial
218
information from the public.
Defendants in New York also
counterclaimed that a single corporation should not be allowed to
privatize the nation’s land records without greater transparency
are used like a disposable filter: absorbing and deflecting origination claims and
defenses until those claims and defenses render the business structure
unusable.”). It should be noted that “[m]ost individual consumers bring their
predatory lending claims not as plaintiffs, but as counterclaims in defense of
foreclosure proceedings.” Id. at 2267.
212. See id at 2273.
213. Id. at 2189.
214. Id.
215. See id.; Brandt, supra note 13.
216. See Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 503–4
(Minn. 2009) (Page, J., dissenting). The TILA specifies that if certain disclosures
are not made (e.g., incorrect calculation of finance charges or payment schedules)
the loan may be rescinded for up to a period three years. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a),
(f) (2006). Upon rescission, the loan principle must be paid back but the
borrower is not responsible for any finance charges (i.e., like an interest free loan,
all payments made up to that point are credited toward repayment of the
principle). See § 1635(b). However, a rescission can only be made “against any
assignee of the obligation.” § 1641(c). This defense does not affect the loan
originator or servicer. See id. MERS noted that none of the plaintiffs were raising
a TILA defense. See MERS’s Brief, supra note 76, at 36 (“It should be noted that
Plaintiffs raise absolutely no defenses to the foreclosures they are seeking to stop,
reverse, void, cancel, or delay.”).
217. See Cohen, supra note 207, at 1 (quoting Amber Hawkins).
218. See id.; see also Peterson, supra note 61, at 2266–67, 2280 (noting that
homeowners can no longer turn to the land records to learn the identity of owner
of their debt).
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219

and significant government oversight.
Partly in response to the numerous MERS lawsuits raising this
issue, the federal government recently passed the Helping Families
Save Their Homes Act of 2009, which amended the TILA by
requiring lenders to notify homeowners within thirty days when
220
their loan is sold or transferred.
Following this amendment,
MERS announced its new InvestorID program, which is designed to
automatically send a notice to borrowers when ownership of their
221
loan changes.
In an effort to address predatory lending concerns, Minnesota
Attorney General Lori Swanson pushed the legislature to make
222
several amendments to state banking laws.
Amber Hawkins,
former Staff Attorney for the Legal Aid Society of Minneapolis,
stated that “Minnesota’s new anti-predatory lending laws are now
223
among the strongest in the country.”
Unfortunately, these laws
were not enacted in time to help the plaintiffs in Jackson.
219. See, e.g., Amici for Romaine, supra note 209, at 1 (“MERS is eroding the
public databases of this nation and unjustly withholding critically important
information from homeowners. . . . [MERS is designed] without regard to its
infringement of essential public and individual rights.”).
220. Interview with Amber Hawkins, supra note 49. See also Helping Families
Save Their Homes Act, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 Stat. 1632 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the United States Code) (promulgating an effort
to prevent mortgage foreclosures and enhance mortgage credit availability).
221. See Karmela Lejarde, MERS Response to New TILA Legislation Passed by
Congress and the Obama Administration, MORTGAGEMAG NEWS (June 10, 2009),
http://www.mortgagemag.com/news/2009/0601/1000010667070.htm.
On its
website, MERS also offers the ServicerID function, which provides a number of
ways to search for the servicing agent for loans registered with MERS. See MERS®
Servicer Identification System, MERS, https://www.mers-servicerid.org/sis/ (last
visited Sept. 17, 2010). Typically, the results display the names of the servicer and
the investor, with contact information for both. Id. See also supra note 87 and
accompanying text (discussing the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act’s
requirement of sending a “hello/goodbye letter” when changing loan servicers).
222. See MINN. STAT. §§ 58.13, .137, .161, .18 (2008). The amendments protect
borrowers by (1) creating a duty of agency between the borrower and mortgage
broker, (2) preventing fraud on mortgage applications, and (3) requiring
verification of a borrower’s ability to repay their obligation over the entire course
of the loan, as opposed to just the first year. See Drum Major Institute’s
Marketplace of Ideas, Predatory Mortgage Lending with Lori Swanson (Jan. 4, 2010),
http://www.mortgagerefinancingref.com/predatory-mortgage-lending-with-loriswanson.html (online video recording of Minnesota Attorney General Lori
Swanson speaking on Minnesota’s “successful predatory mortgage lending law”).
223. Interview with Amber Hawkins, supra note 49. Minnesota has also
amended the foreclosure by advertisement statutes by requiring that the
foreclosing party provide a defaulting borrower with information on the
availability of counseling prior to foreclosure. See MINN. STAT. § 580.021 (2008).
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When reading the plaintiffs’ affidavits, you can’t help but feel
sorry for them, particularly Jewelean Jackson and David Williams.
Both were taken advantage of through predatory lending
224
schemes.
However, the legal issue for the Minnesota Supreme
Court was solely to decide whether MERS was in compliance with
225
the foreclosure by advertisement statutes. MERS considered the
plaintiffs’ attempt to interject any connection between the MERS
System and predatory lending as “unfounded and irrelevant to the
226
legal question [the] Court must decide.”
Ultimately, the court
chose to narrow its focus to the issue of foreclosures, leaving the
227
broader predatory lending issues for the legislature.
C.

Tax Evasion or Efficient Business?

Advocates of the MERS System often point out the substantial
cost savings electronic recordation provide over the traditional
method of recording a paper copy of the security instrument with
the county recorder or registrar of titles each time the loan changes
228
hands. Others claim that these “cost savings” really amount to a
229
form of legalized tax evasion.
MERS currently charges a fee of $4.95 to register a loan on the
230
MERS System.
Once on the system, MERS members, who pay
annual fees based on their size and trading volume, can transfer

224. See Affidavit of Jackson, supra note 125, at 1–2; Affidavit of Williams, supra
note 139, at 1–2.
225. See MERS’s Brief, supra note 76, at 40–41.
226. Id. at 40. The plaintiffs’ Amicus Brief also largely focused on racial
discrimination. See Brief for Myron Orfield et al. as Amici Curiae for Plaintiffs at 1,
Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 08-305, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10798 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2008) (stating in the first two sentences that “housing
discrimination did not end with the passage of the Fair Housing Act.
Discrimination against racial minorities seeking to rent, buy, and insure houses
continues to be an endemic problem across the United States.”).
227. Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 502
(Minn. 2009) (“[R]esolving these problems is beyond the scope of the issue before
us and thus beyond our decision-making authority.”). Robert Pratte, MERS’s
attorney, stated that he respects the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ efforts in trying to help
the plaintiffs avoid foreclosure, but “this is not the way to do it.” Cohen, supra
note 207, at 1.
228. Amici for MERS, supra note 89, at 4–5; see also supra note 88 and
accompanying text.
229. Peterson, supra note 61, at 2212.
230. Affidavit of Hultman, supra note 69, ¶ 10.
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231

loans electronically to other members. By contrast, the filing fee
232
for each mortgage assignment in Hennepin County is $46.
Depending on the number of transactions a company makes in a
year, this difference can represent a significant cost savings per
transaction. One estimate claims MERS saves the mortgage
233
industry $200 million a year.
Those who are opposed to MERS argue that the money the
county recording offices charge is often used to fund a variety of
other government functions, including court systems, legal aid
234
organizations, and schools.
With respect to how the loss
indirectly harms the public, they consider the MERS System as a
235
tool for tax evasion.
Advocates of MERS maintain that the public greatly benefits
236
Not only is lending capital more
from this business innovation.
237
quickly freed up to create more loans, a portion of the cost
238
The remaining
savings is typically passed onto the borrower.
portion of the savings benefits the millions of investors who have a
direct interest in mortgage-backed securities and, to a lesser
degree, nearly everyone else who maintains an interest-bearing
239
account through indirect exposure.
The amici brief point out that, “without such benefits, it is
unlikely that consumer-oriented government corporations and
agencies—Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, and the Federal
Housing Administration, and the Department of Veteran Affairs—
would have participated in the creation of MERS and served on the

231. See Arnold, supra note 10, at 34–35; see also MERS Pricing, MERS,
https://www.mersinc.org/MersProducts/pricing.aspx?mpid=1 (last visited Sept.
17, 2010).
232. Brandt, supra note 13.
233. Arnold, supra note 10, at 35.
234. Peterson, supra note 61, at 2212.
235. Id. See also Diane Lim Rogers, Even Taxes on ‘Evil Corporations’ Will Affect
Real People, SEEKING ALPHA (May 5, 2010), http://seekingalpha.com/article/203090even-taxes-on-evil-corporations-will-affect-real-people (stating that ultimately the
burden of evaded taxes falls on individual taxpayers).
236. See Slesinger & McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 812–13.
237. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
238. Affidavit of Hultman, supra note 69, ¶ 10.
239. Brett Arends, Should You Invest In Toxic Assets? WALL ST. J., Jul. 29, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB1000142405297020360920457431
6610509900476.html; see also Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. v. Revoredo, 955 So. 2d
33, 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (describing the MERS System as a “commercially
effective means of business”).
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240

MERS steering committee.”
Beyond the federal government,
many state and county officials have also served on the MERS
241
Advisory Council.
Considering all this government support for
MERS, as well as the benefits passed on to the public, the
opposition’s highly theoretical argument that these cost savings
amount to tax evasion appears to be broken from reality.
D.

The Implications of Ruling Against MERS

MERS considered the plaintiffs’ suit “nothing less than a
frontal attack” on the current methods to maintain land records
242
used by Minnesota’s property law community. They claimed that
the plaintiffs’ efforts to avoid or delay foreclosure were nothing
more than an attempt to undercut the sanctity of the contracts they
agreed to by avoiding the debt obligations they owed while
243
remaining in their homes. According to MERS, not only would a
ruling in favor of the plaintiffs require more expensive and
inefficient foreclosure procedures, it would have also had a
devastating impact on the ability of many Minnesotans to obtain
244
future financing. MERS also argued that an affirmative answer to
the certified question had the potential to cloud thousands of titles
in Minnesota, further eroding the value of many properties and
245
doing nothing to help the current economic crisis.
Justice Anderson stated that the majority affirmed the long246
standing principles that govern Minnesota real property law, a
decision which is in accord with the majority of other jurisdictions

240. Amici for MERS, supra note 89, at 4.
241. See Arnold, supra note 10, at 36 (“Generally, county recorders have been
far more supportive than some would believe.”). Some believe the future of land
recording offices lies in electronic recording systems. Interview with Chuck
Hoyum, supra note 102. “Over the course of one generation we are likely to see
some major changes in our current recording system.” Id. “One major change
will likely be a push towards electronic recordation” but it will likely be one that is
similar to the current grantor-grantee indexes now used, rather than one that is
similar to MERS. Id. Some have expressed concerns about MERS destroying land
records, others fear losing their jobs. See Arnold, supra note 10, at 36 (“Some
recorders have expressed concerns that MERS will eliminate their offices
nationwide or destroy the public land records by breaking the chain of title.”).
242. MERS’s Brief, supra note 76, at 35.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 35–36.
245. Interview with Chuck Hoyum, supra note 102.
246. Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 500–501
(Minn. 2009).
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who have considered MERS’s authority to foreclose. The dissent,
on the other hand, was left unconvinced that an “equitable
248
assignment” required no recordation.
Justice Page stated that if
the assignment can be made in writing, according to plain
language of the foreclosure by advertisement statutes, it must be
249
recorded.
However, if taken literally, this interpretation of what must be
recorded would require a wholesale transformation of Minnesota’s
recording system. Currently, there is no way to record anything
other than legal title to the security instrument in the county
250
As Judge Schwartz from the Florida District
recording offices.
Court of Appeals stated, “the problem arises from the difficulty of
attempting to shoehorn a modern innovative instrument of
commerce into nomenclature and legal categories which stem
251
essentially from the medieval English land law.”
It is doubtful that an electronic database that tracks loans
being bundled together and traded nationally could have been
foreseen under the lamp light over 160 years ago when the

247. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. Since Jackson, several new
cases have been tried; the majority of jurisdictions continue to favor MERS. See
Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. CV 09-517-PHX-JAT, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 87997 (D. Ariz. Sep. 24, 2009) (dismissing claims made by three
borrowers against a group of defendants that included MERS); Mortg. Elec.
Registration Sys. v. Mosley, No. 93170, 2010 Ohio LEXIS 2380 (Ct. App. Jun. 24,
2010) (finding MERS had standing to foreclose); Bucci v. Lehman Bros. Bank, No.
PC-2009-3888, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 110 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 25, 2009) (holding that MERS
had the authority to foreclose as a nominee for the debts owner). But see Mortg.
Elec. Registration Sys. v. Chong, No. 2:09-CV-00661-KJD-LRL, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 127500, at *9 (D. Nev. Dec. 4, 2009) (stating that because MERS provided
no evidence that it was the agent or nominee for the current owner of the
beneficial interest in the note, it failed to meet its burden of establishing that it is a
real party in interest with standing); In re Sheridan, No. 08-20381-TLM, 2009
Bankr. LEXIS 552 (D. Idaho Mar. 12, 2009) (denying MERS standing in court
because they failed to provide evidence of any interest in the note and deed of
trust); Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. v. Johnston, No. 420-6-09 Rdcv, 2009 Vt.
LEXIS 15 (Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2009) (dismissing MERS’s action to foreclose for
lack of standing).
248. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 503 (Page, J., dissenting).
249. Id.
250. Interview with Chuck Hoyum, supra note 102.
251. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. v. Revoredo, 955 So. 2d 33, 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2007); see also MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 101 (N.Y. 2006)
(Kaye, C.J., dissenting in part) (“It is the incongruity between the needs of the
modern electronic secondary mortgage market and our venerable real property
laws . . . that frames the issue before us.”).
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foreclosure by advertisement statutes were enacted. The question
then becomes: How is a court to determine the legislative intent
when the issue falls outside of what reasonably could have been
contemplated at the time the law was conceived?
To resolve a dilemma such as this, the court must turn to the
canons of construction. In part, these statutes state that in
ascertaining the intent of a statute, a court must “presume that the
legislature intended to favor a public interest over a private
253
interest.”
Thus, when contemplating the certified question, the
court likely weighed the effect of a decision either way, on both the
plaintiffs and the public.
The prevailing negative answer resulted in Jewelean Jackson,
David Williams, and Brenda Doane losing the opportunity to
challenge the foreclosure of their homes and to discover who
254
owned the note at the time of foreclosure. Fortunately, Ethylon
and William Brown were able to save their primary residence
255
This was a sad and unfortunate
through a loan modification.
outcome, but it was also the lesser of two evils. After all, had the
court ruled against MERS, the delay in the plaintiffs’ foreclosures
sooner or later still would have ended. Eventually, MERS would
have either traced the chain of custody of the debts and filed the
corresponding mortgage assignments in the county recording
256
257
office, initiated judicial foreclosure, or pursued and received
the legislative blessing to foreclose what many argue section
258
507.413—the MERS statute—was intended to confer.
Thus, in the end, more than likely, whichever course pursued
after trial would have concluded with the same results; however, the
cost to society would have been staggeringly high. A ruling against
MERS would have affected many more than just those in or soon
facing foreclosure. Because secondary market investors would be
forced to bear the additional costs of preparing and recording old
assignments prior to initiating foreclosure, the present value of

252. See Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 08-305, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10798, at *14 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2008).
253. Amaral v. St. Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn. 1999); see also
MINN. STAT. § 645.17(5) (2006).
254. Interview with Amber Hawkins, supra note 49.
255. Id.
256. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
257. Amici for MERS, supra note 89, at 13.
258. Interview with Chuck Hoyum, supra note 102.
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259

mortgage loans would be substantially reduced. If the investment
value of mortgage debt decreased, naturally fewer investors would
be willing to purchase the debt from mortgage originators.
Thus, ultimately the consequences of this decision would
impact future borrowers by not only increasing the associated
260
mortgage fees and title insurance costs, but also by severely
261
limiting the availability of capital to generate new loans.
Therefore, it would be both more difficult and more costly to
obtain a mortgage loan in Minnesota.
Worse yet, an affirmative answer had the potential to cloud an
262
If the court had ruled that MERS
enormous number of titles.
never actually held legal title or that the debt holder’s equitable
interest somehow needed to be recorded, property owners who
have satisfied their debts would be faced with the daunting task of
first retracing the chain of custody of each debt that had been
registered on the MERS System and then preparing and filing the
corresponding mortgage assignments in the county recorder’s
263
office.
In the end, individual property owners would likely be
stuck with the bill.
Then, there are the even more troubling problems of what to
do with properties purchased at foreclosure sales initiated by MERS
264
or those acquired through bankruptcy proceedings.
If it was
deemed that MERS was never the proper mortgagee of title, all of
the sales in which they were the seller or trustee are put in
question.
In a suit against MERS initiated in Florida’s circuit court in
Miami-Dade, the Honorable Judge Jon Gordon stated,
I am not certain what remedy, if any, these people would
have were it to be determined that MERS was not ever the
proper party notwithstanding that these folks might have
been in default what their recourse, if any, would be. I’m
not certain with the satisfaction of mortgages that have
been filed on behalf of MERS how good those are and I

259. See Amici for MERS, supra note 89, at 12–13.
260. Id. at 13; Cohen, supra note 207, at 2.
261. See MERS’s Brief, supra note 76, at 36–37.
262. See Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 08-305, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14785, at *4–5 (D. Minn. Feb. 27, 2008) (“[T]he premise of Plaintiffs’
claims threatens grave uncertainty with respect to establishment of chain of titles
for releases and satisfactions of mortgages . . . .”).
263. See supra notes 198–202 and accompanying text.
264. Interview with Chuck Hoyum, supra note 102.
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am not certain how good title to property is that people
bought at these foreclosure sales if it turns or becomes
established that MERS was indeed not only not the right
party but misrepresented by way of their pleadings and
affidavits that they held something they didn’t own, so I’m
265
not certain of the consequences but it seems vast.
With over sixty million mortgage loans registered on the MERS
266
System nationwide, indeed the consequences would be vast.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the number of foreclosures in this country is
staggeringly high, the Minnesota Supreme Court was correct in
their analysis of this decision. There is no doubt that greed of the
mortgage industry played a significant role in the current economic
recession.
However, MERS, representing one of the most
significant business innovations in the mortgage industry since the
formation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, is not the proper party
to blame. The correct parties to blame are the shady lenders and
financiers who funded and originated the predatory loans that
ultimately caused the subprime lending crisis. MERS simply acts as
a middleman for its members; unfortunately, on occasion, this may
include dishonest individuals and companies.
The MERS System represents significant change by developing
the way transfers of interests in mortgage loans are tracked. With
any change as great as this, there are bound to be those who resist.
New legal issues may surface that we have never addressed before.
Many may attempt to take advantage of this new development by
seeking results that would otherwise not be available. These
growing pains are to be expected. This, however, does not mean
that this new innovation is not an improvement over our historic
land recording system or without benefit to the public.
In Jackson v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., the
Minnesota Supreme Court had the power to severely limit MERS’s
ability to foreclose on behalf of their members. Fortunately, they
realized such a decision would have come at a high price.

265. See Serving History, MERS: Litigation and Major Legal Decisions, available at
http://www.servinghistory.com/topics/MERS::sub::Litigation_And_Major_Legal
_Decisions (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
266. McIntire, supra note 92.
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